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1. Introduction
Throughout the post World War II period international trade policy reform has
seldom been absent from the mind of policy-makers. The formation of the General
Agreement of Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) as a forum for the discussion of international
trade and policy issues, the resolution of disputes and as a sponsor of regular rounds
of multilateral negotiations leading to a substantial drop in the average level of tariﬀ
protection has ensured that trade policy issues have retained currency. More recently,
there has been considerable focus on bilateral and regional trade agreements with
the expansion of the customs union of the European Community and the advent of
organizations such as NAFTA, APEC and Mercusor. Nevertheless, cooperative trade
policy remains an important part of the international landscape.
This paper is concerned with some theoretical issues in cooperative multilateral
trade policy reform.1 The focus of the paper is on the structure of the policy reform
problem, particularly as it applies to piecemeal policy reform, and on the similarity
in roles that can be played by income transfers on the one hand and tariﬀs reforms on
the other as redistributive policy instruments. It is shown that the model structure
implies a very close connection between these roles played by tariﬀsa n dt r a n s f e r s .
The ﬁrst, preparatory, task of the paper is to set out a simple competitive model of
world trade that involves tariﬀ distortions and hence yields an equilibrium that is not
Pareto optimal. What is meant by the concept of trade policy reform in the context of
this model is a primary concern. For our purposes, the policy reform problem is one
of making small changes to the policy parameters (piecemeal policy reform) and the
appropriate criteria is that the reforms should generate a strict Pareto improvement
in welfare.
The second task, taking up the major part of the paper, is concerned with the
mechanism by which eﬃciency gains arising out of trade policy reforms can be dis-
tributed amongst countries to achieve a strict Pareto improvement in welfare. Tra-
ditionally, trade theorists have assumed the existence of lump sum income transfers
to distribute eﬃciency gains. Most models have lump sum transfers between coun-
tries and between governments and households. Recently, however, some authors
have given more serious attention to cases where such transfers are not feasible.
Here we focus upon a connection between international income transfers and tariﬀs.
Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000) have shown that, under a mild condition on the
world trade matrix, transfer reforms accompanying quota reforms can be replaced
by suitable multilateral tariﬀ reforms to achieve the same welfare outcome. In the
1For earlier contributions to the literature on multilateral tariﬀ reform see, for example, Hatta and
Fukushima (1979), Mayer (1981), Fukushima and Kim (1989), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991,
1993). More recent analyses of quota reforms have been provided by Anderson and Neary (1996)
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current paper, we generalize this idea to deal with discrete policy reforms. And,
we develop several applications to enhance understanding of the connection between
tariﬀsa n dt r a n s f e r s .
The paper concludes with some remarks about possible future directions of this
type of analysis of trade policy reforms.
2. The Multilateral Policy Reform Problem
2.1. General Structure of Policy Reform. Suppose that the equilibrium con-
ditions for the world economy can be written in the form
F(u,p,τ)=0 , (1)
where F i sav e c t o ro ff u n c t i o n s ,u is a vector of endogenous variables of direct interest
to the policy-makers, p is a vector of endogenous variables of no special interest, and
τ is a vector of policy variables to be chosen by the policy-makers. These equilibrium
conditions for the world economy determine the endogenous variables as functions of
the exogenously chosen policy variables. In the context of the current paper, we can
think of u as a vector of utility levels for single-consumer national economies, p as the
world price vector for goods, and τ as the vector of tariﬀs for all countries. However,
such an assignment is not necessary for what follows; models can diﬀer, but the basic
policy reform problem may be viewed in a common way.
The policy reform problem concerns the relationship between the policy instru-
ments, given by vector τ, and the endogenous variables of special interest, given by
vector u. Starting from an initial equilibrium (solution to the model), the policy
maker wishes to change the values of the policy instruments to generate a change in
u that is regarded by the policy maker as beneﬁcial. The policy reform problem is to
come up with changes in policy that are beneﬁcial. The well-known theorem of the
second best indicates that this is generally a non-trivial task. The issue of tax policy
reform in a closed economy has been well surveyed by Myles (1995, 167-195). In this
paper we concentrate on open economies in a multilateral context.
2.2. A Speciﬁc Trade Model. To make our discussion more concrete, we now
consider a particular model of world trade. In this competitive equilibrium model,
K nations engage in international trade in N g o o d st h a ta r es u b j e c tt oas e to f
trade taxes by each nation. The world price vector for goods is denoted as p and
the trade tax (“tariﬀ”) vector imposed by country k on net imports is given by
τk. Hence, the domestic price vector in country k is pk = p + τk. The production
sector in country k is characterized by a revenue or GDP function Gk(pk),w h i l e
the single household has an expenditure function Ek(pk,u k), where uk denotes the
level of utility. The net revenue function Sk(pk,u k) ≡ Gk(pk)−Ek(pk,u k) provides a
convenient summary characterization of the price-taking behaviour of the household
a n dp r o d u c t i o ns e c t o r s .
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p|Sk
p(p + τk,u k)=bk,k∈ K (3)
X
k∈K
bk =0 . (4)
These are the market equilibrium conditions, the budget constraints for each country
and the world budget constraint. The market equilibrium conditions express the
requirement that the net exports of countries, xk ≡ Sk
p(p+τk,u k) ≡ ∂Sk/∂p,s u mt o
the zero vector, meaning that world markets clear. The budget constraints state that
the value (at world prices) of net exports (the balance of trade) must be matched
by a transfer of income abroad, bk. In our atemporal world, the national budget
constraints are simply the requirements of zero current account balances. The world
budget constraint required these transfers abroad to sum to zero over all countries.2
It is implicit in this formulation of the model that there is just one consumer in
each country, who gets or receives a transfer from the government. To see this, the
national budget constraints may be written as
Ek(p + τk,u k)=Gk(p + τk)+τk|
³
Ek
p(p + τk,u k) − Gk
p(p + τk)
´
− bk,k∈ K, (5)
which states that expenditure by the household equals income from production, plus
net tariﬀ revenue, minus transfers abroad. The latter two terms constitute the gov-
ernment’s net receipts (net budget surplus), assumed to be passed on to the household
in a lump sum.
It is assumed that, for given policy variables b =( b1,...,bK) and τ =( τ1,...,τK),
the market equilibrium and national budget constraint equations determine the en-
dogenous variables of the model, namely the world price vector p À 0 and the vector
of national utilities u =( u1,...,uK).3
2.3. Piecemeal Policy Reform. The multilateral policy reform problem is to
ﬁnd changes in the policy variables that yield a strict increase in the level of utility
for each national household. Several points of clariﬁcation are in order. First, while
the initial tariﬀ-distorted equilibrium may be the consequence of a non-cooperative
strategic policy game, it is implicitly assumed that the policy reform itself is cooper-
ative; the national governments are not engaged in non-cooperative, strategic policy
games during the reform process. This, of course, raises the question of whether the
solution to the policy reform problem will be incentive compatible, that is whether
each participant will continue to honour the cooperative agreement. This issue is
not addressed here and is ignored by assuming a reversion to the initial equilib-
rium, should any country deviate from the agreement. Second, the requirement that
all national households experience a strict increase in welfare is the deﬁnition of a
strict Pareto improvement in welfare (SPI). Countries will not agree to a multilateral
policy change unless they beneﬁt. Accordingly, it is implicitly assumed that unan-
imous support is required for a cooperative agreement to proceed. While a weak
Pareto improvement (no household loses and some gain) could be contemplated, this
2Throughout the paper, we use the symbol K to denote the set of countries (as well as the number)
of countries in the world.
3The notational convention used regarding vector inequalities is as follows: x =( x1,...,xn) ≥ 0
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raises technical issues for diﬀerential policy changes, as explained by Diewert (1978).4
Third, it is assumed that it is not feasible to move directly from a distorted equilib-
rium to a Pareto optimal equilibrium. Accordingly, policy changes are assumed to
be “small” in some sense. We can contemplate diﬀerential or small discrete policy
changes, most of the literature being devoted to the former since it allows analysis by
diﬀerential calculus methods. One reason for greater interest in diﬀerential policy re-
forms is that they have less stringent informational requirements than discrete policy
reforms; diﬀerential reforms simply require knowledge of the values of variables and
all responses at the initial equilibrium, whereas discrete reforms demand knowledge
of the response surfaces at the initial and ﬁnal equilibrium.
3. Redistribution of Efficiency Gains
One of the major issues in trade policy reform concerns the way by which eﬃciency
gains can be distributed to ensure a SPI. To obtain a SPI, we need an increase in
economic eﬃciency created by reducing the distortions in the world economy, but
we also need some mechanism of distributing these gains. An assumption that there
exists the possibility of employing lump sum transfers between countries allows the
separation of these two objectives, since lump sum transfers can always be used
to successfully distribute the gains. If lump sum transfers are not allowed, however,
distortionary taxes and tariﬀs have to accomplish both tasks and this can be diﬃcult.
In this section, we present some results that establish a clear relationship between
tariﬀ reforms and lump sum transfers. This relationship allows us to demonstrate
that tariﬀs can sometimes be used to redistribute eﬃc i e n c yg a i n si nl i e uo fl u m ps u m
transfers.
3.1. Propositions Regarding Discrete Policy Choice. The model used in




p(p + τk,θ,u k)=0 (6)
p|Sk
p(p + τk,θ,u k)=bk,k∈ K (7)
X
k∈K
bk =0 . (8)
This is an extension of the model discussed above to include a vector of policy pa-
rameters other than tariﬀs. This vector is denoted by θ, w h i c hc a nb eg i v e nav a r i e t y
of interpretations depending upon the particular model under discussion. Examples
include θ being a vector of quota restrictions on trade (a case dealt with below) and
domestic commodity taxes. Of course, we can get back to the original model (given
by equations (2)-(4)) by simply ignoring the existence of θ.
4If each household’s utility is increasing in a particular direction of policy change, then there
is a, possibly small, discrete policy change that will yield higher utility. On the other hand, if a
household’s utility is stationary with respect to a policy change (derivative is zero), there is no
guarantee that a small discrete policy change will raise that household’s utility.The Redistribution of Efficiency Gains: Transfers or Tariffs? 5
In the initial equilibrium, the policy parameters (τ0,θ0,b 0) determine the endoge-
nous variables (p0,u 0). Now consider a new situation that involves a discrete change
in policy to (τ1,θ1,b 1) with a solution for the endogenous variables given by (p1,u 1).
The question posed is: can we choose the new tariﬀs so that the initial utility
vector is attained, but without any transfers? That is, given that there is a solution
(τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0) to the equilibrium conditions (6)-(8), is there also a solution of
the form (τ1,θ0,0,p 1,u 0)?S p e c i ﬁcally, this new solution (τ1,θ1,b 1,p 1,u 1) proposed
involves θ1 = θ0, u1 = u0 and b1 =0 . This new solution therefore involves the
same θ policy and yields the same utility vector as the ﬁrst solution, but there are
no transfers. However, the tariﬀ policy and world price outcomes are diﬀerent. The
answer to the question of whether such a solution is possible is “yes”, under suitable
conditions.5
The strategy for the proof is, ﬁrst, to postulate a new solution involving tariﬀs
chosen carefully to keep domestic prices unchanged by “neutralizing” the domestic
price eﬀects of any new world price vector and, second, to demonstrate that the
world price vector can be determined such that all of the equilibrium conditions are
satisﬁed. The existence of a world price vector that is consistent with our multilateral
choice of tariﬀs depends upon a mild condition on the world trade matrix.
To prove this proposition, therefore, we choose the new tariﬀss ot h a ti n i t i a l
domestic prices in each country are retained, that is, p1 + τk1 = p0 + τk0.S i n c e
domestic prices, the θ policy vector, and utility levels are unchanged, consumers
and producers make the same choices as they did initially. Accordingly, the market








p(p0 + τk0,θ0,u k0)=0 . (9)
The world balance of trade conditions (8) hold trivially, since transfers are zero.
Will the individual country balance of trade conditions (7) hold? This requires
the new world price vector p1 to satisfy the equations
p1|Sk
p(p0 + τk0,θ0,u k0)=bk1 ≡ 0,k∈ K. (10)
Deﬁning the initial equilibrium world trade matrix as X ≡
£
x1,...,xK¤
, where xk = Sk
p
is the net export vector for country k, these equations may be written compactly in
matrix form as
p1|X =0 . (11)
Since the world trade matrix has dimension N ×K,t h i si sas e to fK linear equations
in N unknowns given by the elements of vector p1.
What is required in order to complete our demonstration is that this set of ho-
mogeneous linear equations has a positive solution for the world price vector, since
market clearing is assumed. By a version of Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative,
such a solution is assured under the following assumption.6
5We are grateful to Kala Krishna for raising the question of whether our previous results on the
equivalence of diﬀerential changes in tariﬀs and transfers could be extended to discrete changes.
6See Mangasarian (1969, 34) for a general statement of Motzkin’s Theorem of the Alternative and
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Assumption A: There is no solution λ to the inequality system Xλ > 0.
This system may be expressed as
P
k∈K
xkλk > 0. If this system does have a solution,
it is possible to expand or contract each economy (multiply its trade vector by some
n u m b e r )s u c ht h a tn og o o di si ne x c e s sd e m a n da n da tl e a s to n eg o o di si ne x c e s s
supply. Such a solution exists, for example, if there is some country k for which
xk > 0, meaning that country k exports every good (or has zero trade in some
goods).7 In this case, it will clearly not be possible to ﬁnd a positive price vector p1
such that p1|xk =0 . Assumption A rules out such cases and therefore guarantees
that we can ﬁnd a vector of positive prices that satisfy the national budget constraints
(11).
Given this solution, we ﬁnd the appropriate tariﬀs vectors from the required
relation p1 + τk1 = p0 + τk0. Thus
τk1 = p0 + τk0 − p1, (12)
where p1 is any positive solution to the equation system (11). This completes our
demonstration. The result may be conveniently recorded in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If (τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0) solves the equilibrium conditions (6)-(8) and As-
sumption A holds, then we can construct another solution of the form (τ1,θ0,0,p 1,u 0).
That is, any equilibrium involving income transfers can be replaced by an equilibrium
without transfers, but with the same welfare outcome, by an appropriate choice of
tariﬀs. Appropriate tariﬀsa r eg i v e nb y( 12), where p1 is any positive solution to the
equation system (11).
While we have chosen b1 =0in this proposition, there is no need to do so. If
we choose the transfers in the new situation arbitrarily, the same argument follows
except that now the requirement for satisfaction of the budget constraints is that p1
is a positive solution to the equation system:
p1|X = b1|. (13)
The assumption that guarantees a positive solution to these equations for the world
price vector is the following.




The solution to this set of linear equations determines the new world price vector
and then the required tariﬀs in the new situation are given by (12). Thus, we get the
following slightly more general proposition.
7This could happen if that country has a positive trade balance, b
k > 0.











A solution to this system means that it is possible to expand or contract each economy (multiply its
trade vector and trade deﬁcit by some number) so that no good is in excess demand and there is no
world payments surplus, and that either some good is in excess supply or there is a world payments
deﬁcit. The existence of a positive solution for prices to the national budget constraints requires that
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Proposition 2. If (τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0) solves the equilibrium conditions (6)-(8) and As-
sumption B holds, then we can construct another solution of the form (τ1,θ0,b 1,p 1,u 0).
That is, any equilibrium involving income transfers can be replaced by an equilibrium
with a diﬀerent set of transfers, but with the same welfare outcome, by an appropri-
a t ec h o i c eo ft a r i ﬀs. Appropriate tariﬀsa r eg i v e nb y( 12), where p1 is any positive
solution to the equation system (13).
3.2. Discussion. What these propositions establish is an “equivalence” between
transfers and tariﬀs. Speciﬁcally, the utility vector that arises from any equilibrium
involving a set of international income transfers can be attained from another equilib-
rium that does not involve any such transfers (Proposition 1). This new equilibrium
is achieved by the imposition of a carefully selected set of tariﬀsf o re a c hc o u n t r y .
In this sense, a set of transfers can be replaced by a suitably chosen set of tariﬀs;
transfers are redundant policy instruments. In the case of Proposition 2, what we
have shown is that any new set of income transfers can be “neutralized” by a careful
choice of tariﬀs in the sense that the initial utility vector will remain the equilibrium
outcome.
While these propositions show that any transfer can be replaced by tariﬀst og e t
the same welfare outcome, the reverse is not true in general. Thus, we cannot change
all tariﬀs arbitrarily and replace them by a set of transfers to get the same welfare
outcome, in general. The exception is where the change in tariﬀsi st h es a m ef o re a c h
country. Thus, transfers can be replaced by suitable tariﬀs, but a general structure
of tariﬀs cannot be replaced by transfers.
It is noteworthy that the tariﬀ reforms required to go from one equilibrium to
the other are the same for every country. This follows from our requirement that
domestic prices remain the same under the two policy regimes. Accordingly, the
changei ne a c hc o u n t r y ’ st a r i ﬀ vector is given by τk1 −τk0 = p0 −p1, which is clearly
the same for every country. Also noteworthy is the fact that the net export vectors
for each country are unchanged by the change in policy from transfers to tariﬀs, so
the volume and pattern of trade is unaﬀected. Thus, all real variables in the model
are unchanged by this change of policy, as are domestic prices. The only diﬀerences
in the two scenarios are in the tariﬀ and transfer policy instruments and the world
price vector. This arises from a dependency that exists between these variables of
the model.
Figure 1 contains an oﬀer curve diagram to illustrate Proposition 2. The ﬁgure
shows oﬀer curves for two countries (in net export space for one country). These oﬀer
curves have their origin at point T, which represents the initial transfer in terms of
good 2. The initial equilibrium is at E. The initial world price vector is p0, which
is normal to the line TE, the domestic price vector for country 1 is p0 + τ10 and
the trade vector for country 1 is OE. The same trade vector can be supported with
the same utilities and the same domestic price vectors, but with no transfers, if the
new world price vector is p1, which is normal to the trade vector OE. In the new
equilibrium, the tariﬀ vectors adjust to ensure that the domestic prices are unchanged
and the new trade balances are zero, implying zero transfers.
3.3. Two Special Cases. The development above is reasonably general. Under-
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cases.
Tariﬀs Replace Transfers. Here we consider that scenario 0 has no tariﬀ re-
form; a θ reform, accompanied by transfers, yields a SPI. Thus we have ∆τ0 =0 ,
while ∆θ0 and ∆b0 are non-zero and generate a SPI given by ∆u0 À 0. The new
equilibrium is therefore (τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0). In scenario 1 there are no transfers and
no change in transfers (b1 = ∆b1 =0 )b u tat a r i ﬀ reform ∆τ1 is now permitted to
accompany the same θ reform ∆θ0. By Proposition 2, we know that the new tariﬀ
structure can support the same utility vector as in scenario 0. The new scenario 1
equilibrium is therefore (τ1,θ0,0,p 1,u 0). A comparison of the two equilibria reveals
that the diﬀerence in tariﬀs in the two equilibria, given by τ1 − τ0, has simply re-
placed transfers as a means of achieving utility vector u0 when policy reform ∆θ0 is
undertaken.9 That we can get the same change in utility means that the tariﬀ reform
eﬀectively replaces the transfer reform as a redistributive device.
TariﬀsR e p l a c eT a r i ﬀsa n dT r a n s f e r . In this second special case, we do not
allow a θ reform in either policy scenario and hence consider only a tariﬀ reform with
(in scenario 0) and without (in scenario 1) transfers.
Now consider two policy reforms (∆τ0,∆θ0 =0 ,∆b0,∆p0,∆u0) and (∆τ1,∆θ1 =
0,∆b1 =0 ,∆p1,∆u0) leading to equilibria (τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0) and (τ1,θ0,b 1 =0 ,p 1,u 0)
with ∆u1 = ∆u0 À 0. Thus, both reforms yield the same welfare outcome but with
diﬀerent policy settings. Given that (τ0,θ0,b 0,p 0,u 0) is an equilibrium for the model,
P r o p o s i t i o n2c a nb eu s e dt od e m o n s t r a t et h a t(τ1,θ0,b 1 =0 ,p 1,u 0) is also a viable
equilibrium. Scenario 0 involves a reform of tariﬀsa n dt r a n s f e r st h a tl e a d st oaS P Ii n
welfare. Scenario 1 also involves a tariﬀ reform and leads to the same SPI in welfare,
but does not involve any income transfers.
Accordingly, we have able to show that the transfer reform accompanying the
tariﬀ reform in scenario 0 can be dispensed with, provided the tariﬀ reform is altered
appropriately from ∆τ0 to ∆τ1. The diﬀerence between this result and that obtained
for the previous special case discussed above is that in this second special case there
is no reform of the policy parameter vector θ. Thus, the second special case applies
to a model where the focus is completely on tariﬀ reform.
The result yielded by this second special case is rather strong. Suppose that we
have a discrete tariﬀ and transfer policy reform that yields a strict Pareto improve-
ment in welfare. Then our result tells us that we can dispense totally with the income
transfers and can construct another tariﬀ reform that provides for exactly the same
SPI welfare change. In other words, there is an equivalence between transfers and
tariﬀs in the sense that transfers can be replaced by a suitable multilateral reform
of tariﬀs. The reason for this result is that there are suﬃcient tariﬀsi nt h ew o r l d
described by our assumptions to replicate and welfare outcome that transfers are able
to achieve.10
9This is made even clearer if there are no tariﬀs in the inital equilibrium, in which case τ
0 =0 .
Then (τ,b) is (0,b
0) in scenario 0 equilibium and (τ
1,0) in scenario 1 equilibrium.
10In an extension of scenario 1, we can simply contemplate a diﬀerent transfer reform ∆b
1 6=0
that involves b
1 6=0 . Then, for any such arbitrary change of transfers, we can construct another
tariﬀ reform that provides for exactly the same welfare change. Thus, the change in transfers from
b
0 to b
1 can be accomodated by the change in tariﬀsf r o mτ
0 to τ
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This suggests a two-step approach to tariﬀ reform. The ﬁrst step involves ﬁnding
at a r i ﬀ reform that, alone with a suitable set of multilateral transfers, is able to
generate a strict welfare gain. This problem has been addressed by several authors
and various suggested tariﬀ reforms are available. Step two involves the use of the
ﬁrst solution to the tariﬀ reform problem to create a new tariﬀ reform, from the
same initial equilibrium, that involves no transfers (the special case of ∆b1 =0 ) .
This new reform could be the one implemented if transfers are not permitted. This
two-step procedure is, of course, a purely analytical device that helps to understand
the anatomy of tariﬀ reform; it is not put forward as a procedure to be followed in
the actual practice of multilateral negotiations for tariﬀ reform.
3.4. Some Applications. Here some applications of the propositions are dis-
cussed.
Transfer Problem. In the context of the model of trade under discussion here,
Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) showed that it was possible to establish a SPI by
a pure redistribution of income via international lump sum transfers, provided that
some country exhibits a consumption inferiority. While their analysis is for a SPI
arising from a diﬀerential change in transfers, it obviously implies the existence of
a SPI arising from a (possibly small) discrete change in transfers. Assume that the
required conditions hold for such a SPI to occur and that the equilibrium following
a discrete change in transfers is (τ0,b 0,p 0,u 0), in which we ignore policy vector θ.11
Thus, the change in the equilibrium is (∆τ0,∆b0,∆p0,∆u0)=( 0 ,∆b0,∆p0,∆u0)
with ∆u0 À 0.
Now consider an alternative discrete policy change (from the original initial equi-
librium) that achieves the same welfare change as the pure transfer reform just de-
scribed. The change is to be (∆τ1,0,∆p1,∆u0), which involves a tariﬀ reform (but
no change in transfers) and the same welfare change ∆u0 À 0. The new equilibrium
is therefore (τ1,b 0,p 1,u 0). By Proposition 2, we know that such an equilibrium is
possible, provided that Assumption B on the world trade matrix is satisﬁed.
Thus, it has been shown that, instead of using a pure transfer reform to obtain
a SPI as did Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988), we can use a carefully chosen
multilateral tariﬀ reform to achieve exactly the same welfare outcome. Of course,
the equilibrium is not the same since, for example, the world price vector will be
diﬀerent under the two diﬀerent policies. Nevertheless, tariﬀs can be used to achieve
the same welfare outcome that transfers were able to achieve. Thus, we have been
able to extend the Turunen-Red and Woodland result on the existence of SPI transfer
reforms to the existence of equivalent SPI uniform tariﬀ reforms.
This result occurs because each country has a full set of tariﬀsa ti t sd i s p o s a l
to ensure that domestic prices are kept unchanged even though the world prices are
aﬀected. By a “full set of tariﬀs” we mean N − 1 tariﬀs, since the tariﬀ on any
one of the N goods can be set to zero without any loss of generality (as discussed
above). If we choose this good conveniently to be the numeraire (whose world price
can be set to unity, again without loss of generality), the N −1 tariﬀsc a nb eu s e dt o
11The model used by Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) is that of (2)-(4), which corresponds to
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neutralize any change the world price vector would otherwise have upon the domestic
price vector.
Commodity Taxes. Next, we consider the consequences for the above propo-
sitions if some countries have a set of domestic commodity taxes in place. In this
case there is a distinction between consumer and producer prices and the net export
functions depend separately upon these two sets of prices. Accordingly, for the above
argument to proceed in the same way, both consumer and producer prices have to be
maintained at their initial values even though world prices change. This is possible,
since producer prices can be maintained at the initial levels by an adjustment of tar-
iﬀs, while consumer prices can be maintained by an adjustment of commodity taxes.
Then the market equilibrium conditions will hold and the appropriate choice for the
world price vector comes from solving the balance of trade conditions as described
above. Thus, the propositions can be readily extended to handle domestic taxes.
Quota Reforms. Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000) develop results concern-
ing the “equivalence” between diﬀerential quota and transfer reforms on the one hand
and diﬀerential quota and tariﬀ reforms on the other. Here we show that this equiv-
alence, established in the diﬀerential policy reform context, also applies to discrete
policy reforms.

















q,u k)=bk,k∈ K (15)
X
k∈K
bk =0 . (16)
where vk
q ≡ (pq + τk
q),k ∈ K1 and vk
q ≡ xk
q,k ∈ K2. In this model, net exports
of traded goods are given by xk = Sk
p(pt + τk
t,p q + τk
q,u k) for countries k ∈ K1
without any quota restrictions; for countries k ∈ K2 that have quota restrictions on
net trades of the subset of goods labeled by the subscript q, net exports are given
by xk = Sk
p(pt + τk
t,x k
q,u k), where xk
q is the vector of quotas. As previously, the
equations of the model are the market equilibrium conditions, the budget constraints
for each country, and the world budget constraint.
Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000) showed that a diﬀerential reform of quotas
and transfers that yields a SPI can be replaced by the same diﬀerential reform of
quotas and an appropriate multilateral, diﬀerential reform of tariﬀs that yields exactly
the same welfare improvement. Here we show that the same results obtains when
we consider discrete policy reforms. The demonstration of this result follows from
observing that the model (14)-(16) correspond exactly to the general model given
by (6)-(8) above, where θ = x is the vector of all quotas on trade. Accordingly,
the propositions established above apply to the current model of quotas. Therefore,
assuming that there is a solution (τ0,x 0,b 0,p 0,u 0) to the equilibrium conditions (14)-
(16), there is another solution of the form (τ1,x 0,0,p 1,u 0) that has no transfers butThe Redistribution of Efficiency Gains: Transfers or Tariffs? 11
the same set of quotas and utility levels. The tariﬀs that achieve this outcome are
chosen (in the same way as done above) to keep domestic prices unchanged.
3.5. The Diﬀerential Policy Reform Case. The discussion above has focused
on a comparison of discrete policy reforms. Here the case of small or diﬀerential
policy reforms is brieﬂy discussed and compared to the discrete policy reform case.
The Main Proposition. For concreteness, we present the ideas in the context
of the extended model dealt with above for the discrete reform case. The proposi-
tion and proof follow those provided by Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000) for the
speciﬁc model of trade (given above) in which both tariﬀ and quota distortions oc-
cur. However, the proposition stated below is more general in that it allows for tariﬀ
reforms in both policy scenarios.









p (pt + τk
t,θ,u k)dp = dbk,k∈ K (18)
X
k∈K
dbk =0 . (19)
Consider two alternative policy reforms enacted at a common initial equilibrium.
We assume a solution for policy 0 of the form (dτ0,dθ0,db 0,dp 0,du 0) with du0 À 0.
We now propose a solution of the form (dτ1,dθ1,db 1,dp 1,du 1)=( dτ1,dθ0,0,dp 1,du 0)
with db1 =0and du0 À 0. In this new solution, the same θ policy change is enacted
and the same welfare outcome is required as in the original policy reform, there are
no transfers, and the tariﬀ policy and world price changes are diﬀerent. We wish to
show that such a policy change is indeed possible under a particular rank condition
on the world trade matrix.
The demonstration that the new solution to the comparative statics equations
is feasible proceeds by choosing a tariﬀ reform that ensures that the changes in
domestic prices are the same under the two policy scenarios, that is, that dp1+dτk1 =
dp0 +dτk0. By ensuring that the diﬀerential changes in domestic prices are the same
under both policy scenarios, along with the same θ reform and the same change in
utilities, it is easy to see that the changes in the net export vectors are also the
same in both scenarios. Hence, market equilibrium is preserved under policy 1.S i n c e
changes in the transfers are zero by assumption, the world budget constraints are
satisﬁed.
Therefore, it remains to be checked whether the national budget constraints will









|dp1 = dbk1 =0 ,k∈ K, (21)
where initial values of variable have no indicator and changes in variables for the two
policies are indicated by superscripts 0 and 1.S i n c e dSk1
p = dSk0
p , it follows thatThe Redistribution of Efficiency Gains: Transfers or Tariffs? 12





= dbk0,k∈ K. (22)








Let us assume a suitable condition that ensures a non-trivial solution to these equa-
tions.
Assumption C:The world trade matrix X ≡
£
x1,...,x K¤
has rank equal to K −
1 ≤ N − 1.




Once determined, this solution yields the required tariﬀ reform given by
dτk1 = dp0 − dp1 + dτk0. (24)
Thus, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Let the world trade matrix at the initial equilibrium, X, satisfy
Assumption C (Rank Condition) below. If (dτ0 =0 ,dθ0,db 0,dp 0,du 0) solves the
comparative statics equations (17)-(19) then we can construct another solution of
the form (dτ1,dθ0,db 1 =0 ,d p 1,du 0). That is, if there exists a diﬀerential reform
of policy parameters θ and transfers (dθ0,db 0) that yields a SPI in welfare, then
there also exists a diﬀerential reform of policy parameters θ and tariﬀs (dθ0,dτ0)
with no accompanying transfer reform, that yields the same SPI in welfare. That is,
the reform of transfers accompanying the reform of θ can be replaced by a suitable
multilateral reform of tariﬀs. The appropriate tariﬀ reform is given by dτk1 = dp0 −




This proposition is a generalization of a result developed in Turunen-Red and
Woodland (2000) for the case where θ is a vector of quotas on trade. In their
Theorem 1, the scenario 0 reform does not involve a reform of tariﬀs, whence dτ0 =0 .
The present proposition is a generalization by allowing a tariﬀ reform to be part of
scenario 0. Apart from this, the outline of the proof provided above follows that in
Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000).
In the special case where the dτ0 =0 , this proposition shows that an accompa-
nying diﬀerential transfer reform can be dispensed with and replaced by a suitable
multilateral diﬀerential tariﬀ reform; the diﬀerential welfare gain is the same under
either policy. In the more general case, when scenario 0 involves a tariﬀ reform,
a further suitable multilateral change in tariﬀs can compensate for the diﬀerential
removal of transfers.
It is clear from the above demonstration that the diﬀerential reform case is very
similar to the discrete reform case. While the diﬀerential case has been discussed in
12The solution allows us to set dp
i
1 =0 , as required by the assumption that the price of the
numeaire is ﬁxed at unity, and hence to have the tariﬀs on the numeraire equal to zero in every
country.The Redistribution of Efficiency Gains: Transfers or Tariffs? 13
detail by Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000), it has been presented above in order
to show a diﬀerence that relates to the conditions on the world trade matrix required
for the appropriate propositions to hold. It is to this diﬀerence that attention is now
turned.
Comparison of Discrete and Diﬀerential Reforms Conditions. The ques-
tion arises as to why the condition on the world trade matrix is apparently diﬀer-
ent depending on whether we are dealing with discrete policies or diﬀerential policy
changes. Assumption C, our rank condition required to solve (23), is weaker (more
easily satisﬁed) than Assumption A made further above to ensure a positive solution
to (13). The reason lies in the fact that the discrete case requires a solution for the
new world price vector, which has to be positive to be consistent with the market
clearing conditions. By contrast, the diﬀerential analysis is undertaken at the initial
price vector, which is positive. The diﬀerential comparative statics results are valid
in a suﬃciently small neighbourhood of the initial positive price vector and so the
new price vector will be positive in this neighbourhood.
In short, the diﬀerential analysis demands less than the discrete analysis and
so the required conditions for the validity of our results are less stringent in the
diﬀerential policy reform case.
4. Concluding Remarks
Multilateral policy reforms have particular importance because of the role of the
GATT (now the WTO) in the international trade negotiations over the post-war
period. This paper has concentrated on some particular aspects of the multilateral
policy reform problem. In particular, attention has focused on the structure of the
competitive trade model used to analyze the problem, the structure of the solutions
and the implications for tariﬀ and transfers policies designed to accompany other
trade policy reforms to achieve Pareto improvements in welfare.
The paper has demonstrated that the model structure has signiﬁcant implications
for the important theoretical and practical question of how eﬃciency gains arising
from trade policy reform can be distributed to countries to ensure that all countries
beneﬁt in a welfare sense. If lump sum transfers (employed by most trade analysts)
are not available policy instruments, the achievement of a strict Pareto improvement
must depend on changes in distortionary taxes, such as domestic taxes or tariﬀso n
trade. Our results developed in this paper (extending the ideas presented previously
in Turunen-Red and Woodland (2000)) show that, under a mild condition on the
world trade matrix, it does not matter whether lump sum transfers are available.
An equilibrium with transfers can be replaced by an equilibrium with no transfers
if tariﬀs are appropriately adjusted. This ability to replace transfers by tariﬀsi sa
result of the structure or anatomy of the model of international trade, whereby the
terms of trade eﬀects for a country and a lump sum transfers are equivalent and
whereby there are suﬃcient tariﬀ instruments to enable countries to neutralize the
domestic price eﬀects of terms of trade movements.
While many possible extensions to the multilateral trade reform literature can be
contemplated, two particular ones come to mind. First, rather than starting from an
arbitrary initial competitive equilibrium, it would be potentially productive to startThe Redistribution of Efficiency Gains: Transfers or Tariffs? 14
from a Nash equilibrium for a trade policy game. This would provide added structure
to the initial equilibrium that could be proﬁtably exploited. A second extension would
be to consider a restricted set of policy reforms. For example, following the ideas in
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) concerning the reciprocity rules of the WTO, tariﬀ reforms
that are world price preserving as well as welfare increasing may constitute interesting
research.
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